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Abstract 
Is globalization forcing non-“Coordinated Market Economies” such as Spain to converge on an 
Anglo-American model? This paper seeks to build on the hypotheses generated by the literature 
on “Varieties of Capitalism” to analyze the challenges of developing and sustaining coordination 
while adjusting for economic change. In particular it seeks to explore ways in which subnational 
factors  promote  the  ability  of  socioeconomic  actors  to  develop  public-private  institutions.  By 
focusing on a particular autonomous region of Spain, the Basque Country, this paper will explore 
the role of institutional arrangements at the regional level in determining national adjustment. In 
the Basque Country the relative power and the particular interests of the regional state have been 
central factors in promoting distinctive patterns of coordination. At the same time, actors’ prefer-
ences and policy outcomes have been constrained by the differences in the quality and configu-
ration of institutional frameworks, political deals, and the existing economic structure.  
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The Puzzle of Coordination at the Regional Level 
 
The Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) literature explains differences and similarities 
in economic policies and economic performance (Hall and Soskice 2001). It focuses on 
the institutional frameworks of market economies and identifies complementarities be-
tween  institutional  arrangements.  It  stresses  that  institutional  arrangements  come  in 
packages that cannot be easily unbound, in which arrangements in one domain are de-
pendent on arrangements in another. Reforms in one area would demand reforms in 
other areas. Institutional arrangements therefore tend to be characterized by clusters of 
complementary institutions. These fall into two broad types, the so-called liberal (LME) 
and coordinated (CME) market economies of Western Europe, North America and Asia. 
The complementary character of institutional arrangements make change problematic. 
Since  the  institutional  arrangements  on  which  CMEs  depend  are  the  product  of  pro-
tracted historical trajectories, it is very difficult for countries that do not have the institu-
tional arrangements for coordination to develop them. When those countries seek to im-
prove their economic performance, therefore, their best option consists of reforms that 
would change them in the direction of the LME model.  
 
While this literature is useful in defining issues for empirical work, it is not clear 
how countries that cannot be easily classified as either a liberal or coordinated economy 
should be classified.  Spain is one of them. According to the VoC literature, Spain (like 
France or Portugal) is characterized by strong strategic coordination in financial mar-
kets, but not in other domains such as labor relations. In these countries there have been 
historically  high levels of state intervention in this  domain, with the coordination of 
labor relations being led by the state (i.e., the minimum wage or the ability to translate a 
wage increase in a firm to the entire sector). Hence some VoC scholars argue that insofar 
as states become more reluctant to coordinate labor relations in those countries, the ab-
sence of institutions for coordinating labor relations like those in CMEs means that labor 
relations in countries like Spain will become more like those in LMEs, moving the whole 
economy in the direction of LMEs (Hall and Thelen 2005: 36).  
 
Yet,  this  paper  will  show  that  developments  in  Spain  point  in  the  opposite 
direction. In Spain changing economic conditions, as well as the shifting interests of the 
economic actors, have promoted institutional changes at the national and regional level 
that  have  promoted  further  coordination  (Royo  2008).  They  support  the  view  that 
economic and institutional change is also the product of policy choices (Locke 1995), 
which have necessarily been impacted by political struggles.  
 
In addition, the VoC literature has tended to underplay the role of institutional 
arrangements at the regional level in determining national adjustment paths, and the 
focus has been largely in developments at the macro level (Royo 2002 and 2008). Yet, in 
Spain there have also been remarkable cases of coordination among economic actors at 
the regional level. On the ground, Spanish firms have developed distinctive initiatives to 
compete more effectively and exploit niche areas in R&D. This paper seeks to analyze 
some of the initiatives that have promoted coordination at the regional level. They have 
been the result of the response of economic actors to a common set of negative (or posi-
tive) externalities, and have led to innovative strategies and institutional changes that 
have  promoted  coordination.  These  regional  initiatives  show  that,  despite  similar 2 
 
political institutions and social structures, the economic actors have a range of resources 
and policy tools to address competitive challenges.  
 
These innovative strategies have been possible in the context of the quasi-federal 
structure of the Spanish state that originated in the 1978 Constitution.1 The literature on 
federalism has noted how attempts by central governments to implement reforms create 
new opportunities (and constraints) for actors at the regional level (see McDermott 2005: 
34). Like in Italy (Locke 1995), regional governments in Spain have played an “enhan-
cing” role for the “third Spain” of small and interconnected firms. Indeed, the develop-
ment of separate regions in Spain has led to the diversification of industry and the devel-
opment of regional strategies to attract investment. The Basque Country is an example of 
this approach.  
 
In this paper I seek to explore ways in which subnational factors promote the 
ability of socioeconomic actors to develop public-private institutions. I seek to address 
the following questions: First, what types of factors contributed to the institutional inno-
vations that have emerged in Spanish regions? Second, why were public and private 
actors able to build these new institutions? I argue that coordination at the regional level 
has been promoted by regional governments, who have played a crucial role. Coopera-
tive arrangements have also been triggered by new competitive challenges and fostered 
by polices that promote the solution of collective-action problems.  
 
The Basque Country has been particularly successful at forging new sustainable 
institutions and interfirm networks where the need for cooperation and the develop-
ment of capabilities to respond to collective-action problems were lacking. Spanish re-
gions have important differences with regard to their economic structure, political and 
socioeconomic organizations, institutions, legal regimes and sectoral regulations. The ex-
amination of this case helps capture the diversity of political and economic models with-
in Spain, the variance in the ways the regional politics interact with the national ones, 
and the conditions  under which  institutional cooperation emerges at the subnational 
level (McDermott 2005; Snyder 2001). 
 
 In the Basque Country the process of institutional change was shaped by the ca-
pacities of the local regional governments, the existing social structure, and political stra-
tegies and incentives that led the economic actors to reshape their strategies. This paper 
shows  that  the  development  of  institutional  coordination  at  the  regional  level  is  a 
collective-action problem conditioned by political, economic, and social factors. In re-
sponse to new economic and competitive challenges the Basque regional government 
and the economic actors have developed innovative capacities that have promoted fur-
ther coordination. They have built a constellation of private-public institutions that have 
helped firms address collective-action problems. This was a remarkable development 
                                                 
1This process of decentralization is almost unparalleled, as it has led to a profound transforma-
tion of the political, economic, administrative, and institutional organization of the country. CCAA 
can enact laws that have the same force as Spanish laws, and their executive governments are not 
subordinate to the central one. While the other fifteen regions rely largely on the state for their fi-
nancial resources, the Basque Country (and Navarre) was able to keep its historical rights (fueros). 
A special economic agreement (concierto económico) for the Basque Country grants the region the 
power to collect and levy all taxes except customs duties and the taxes on petroleum products 
and tobacco. 3 
 
given the deep historical antagonisms among political and socioeconomic actors. Hence, 
this paper challenges the determinism of local, social, political, and economic structures 
for institutional change. 
 
The examination of this case will show that institutional change is also depend-
ent on different political approaches to reform in times of crisis. In the Basque Country 
the economic and sectoral crises led to political initiatives based on empowering eco-
nomic and social actors so they could build new institutions that fostered coordination. 
These institutions have worked to address the collective-action problems of fragmented 
and small-sized enterprises with few skills, limited access to capital and resources, as 
well as an insufficient R&D and knowledge base.  
 
In  response  to  deteriorating  economic  conditions  and  new  competitive  chal-
lenges, the regional government engaged local socioeconomic actors in the development 
of new institutional initiatives to build coordination capacities. It became the leading 
instigator of efforts to build new ties among local companies, and to develop new asso-
ciations and institutions to improve the collective capacity of local enterprises to address 
common challenges. The regional government took great efforts to encourage local firms 
to organize themselves so as to be able to do so by providing incentives and resources to 
small producers. 
 
THE BASQUE COUNTRY: COORDINATION FROM THE TOP 
 
The Development of Industrial Clusters 2 
 
In response to the economic crisis of the late 1970s and early 1980s, which almost 
led to the collapse of its industrial sector, the new Basque government led by the lenda-
kari (the president of the Basque government) Carlos Garaikoetxea, decided to take dras-
tic action in order to restore public confidence. One of the first decisions was to create in 
1981 the Sociedad para la Promoción y Reconversión Industrial (the Agency for the Promo-
tion and Reconversion of Industry, SPRI) within the Department of Industry, Commerce 
and Tourism. The aim of the new company was to provide back-up and services to Bas-
que industry. SPRI is the parent of a group of companies which provide a response to the 
requirements of a business project from the first idea to actual implementation of the 
project. SPRI also uses certain instruments which allow small and medium-sized enter-
prises access to information technology, outward movements on overseas projects, loca-
tion within business environments which are suited to the specific needs of each sector, 
and the use of venture capital funds to finance innovative and strategic projects.3 
 
In the  midst of the crisis and with escalating social conflict and  unrest at the 
plant level, the first task of the new institution was to assist in the management of pri-
vate companies. From this role it grew to promote the internationalization of Basque’s 
businesses and their exports. Over the years SPRI continued expanding and focused on 
four strategic areas: Innovation, Globalization, Industrial Development and the Informa-
tion Society, and it developed specific programs and activities to advance its goals in 
these areas.  In addition, it  developed  new companies to further implement  its goals: 
SPRILUR, which provides suitable and industrial facilities, the Technology Parks: (one in 
                                                 
2This section draws from the Harvard Business School case study by Porter (2005).  
3From SPRI’s website: http://www.spri.es/aSW/web/eng/spri/who/index.jsp. 4 
 
Bizkaia, another one in Gipuzkoa, and a third in Álava, providing state-of-the-art en-
vironments for companies which require these features); the Sociedad De Capital Riesgo, 
which administers funds as minority and temporary stockholdings in business projects; 
and, lastly, the Business Innovation Centers, which smoothen the process of creation and 
development of company projects until these have reached maturity. 
 
The second main initiative from the Basque Government was the development 
by the regional secretary of labor of a Department for Promotion and Economic Devel-
opment in 1983 to supplement SEPRI’s activities. This department was charged with the 
mission of expanding research and  development (quite underdeveloped at the time), 
and to this end it opened several technology centers, a design center, and a robotics tech-
nology center. Furthermore, the Basque Government also focused on the improvement 
and development of infrastructure to support businesses and attract investment. For in-
stance it created the Ente Vasco de la Energia (Basque Energy Board, EVE), which provides 
technical assistance to energy companies and invested in energy sources such as natural 
gas. Finally, the local secretary of education developed the Technology Research Network, 
which was charged with the establishment and management of new technological re-
search centers to further the cooperation of local companies and universities on tech-
nology projects (Porter 2005: 7–8).  
 
In 1986 the Basque Government, under the leadership of a new lendakari, José 
Antonio  Ardanza,  launched  a  Plan  the  Relanzamiento  Excepcional  (the  Exceptional  Re-
launch Program) to promote the development of SMEs, stepped up its investment on 
physical infrastructure and energy resources to facilitate businesses’ operations and fur-
ther attract investment to the region (which has been hindered by the ongoing conflict 
with the Basque terrorist Group, Esukadi Ta Askatasuma – ETA), and launched the pro-
gram “Euskadi Europa 1993,” which included physical infrastructure investment and 
social programs in health and education aimed at preparing the region for the European 
Single Market.  
 
By the mid-1980s when the economy was emerging from the depths of the crisis, 
the Basque government (and in particular its health and labor secretary, Jon Azua) shift-
ed focus and instead of propping up and restructuring troubled companies, it started 
advocating a long-term strategy based on the development of manufacturing clusters. 
However, this strategy was delayed when the 1987 Basque Parliamentary elections led 
to the formation of a coalition between the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) and the So-
cialist Party (PSOE) and Azua left the government to become CEO of the Bilbao Stock Ex-
change. From this position he retained a group of advisors to evaluate the state of the 
Basque economy, and they identified nine clusters4 based on established sectors and also 
new  possible  opportunities:  Machine  Tools,  Automotives,  Steel,  Port  and  Logistics, 
Paper, Financial Services, Fisheries, Tourism, and Agroindustry. While there seemed to 
be support for this approach, the government did little to advance this program (the 
                                                 
4According to  the World Economic Forum (http://www.weforum.org/en/index.htm), “Clusters 
are geographically-centered groups of related firms and industries operating in an environment 
characterized by a high degree of specialization, intense competition and a critical mass of highly 
educated employees from which to extract competitive advantages… This permits the generation 
of a series of operative synergies that constitute sources from which to extract competitive advan-
tages.” 5 
 
only  exception  was  the  Financial  Sector  cluster,  which  was  developed  under  Azua’s 
leadership) (Porter 2005: 8–9).  
 
It was only the crisis of the early 1990s, which led to the collapse of the European 
Monetary System, and three consecutive devaluations of the Spanish peseta, that created 
a new sense of urgency and prodded the Basque government to act. The crisis caused a 
dramatic surge of unemployment (it reached over 20 percent by 1993) and a new indus-
trial crisis. Azua was named new Secretary of Industry and from this position he was 
able to advance his previous agenda. His department identified critical shortcomings in 
the Basque economy: limited skills in areas such as strategy, marketing, and interna-
tional competition; little emphasis on R&D; lack of competition; and dependency on gov-
ernment intervention. The Basque Government was interested in exploring all options to 
address these issues, and they invited the competitiveness scholar Michael Porter to visit 
the Basque Country. During his visit Dr. Porter stressed that in the microeconomics of 
competitiveness, everything mattered, and also that successful implementation of a plan 
would largely hinge on the understanding of the complex interrelationships between 
agents. He emphasized that a new approach based on clusters, would require a reshap-
ing of the functions of the private sector, government, associations and institutions. Nev-
ertheless, policymakers understood that this approach could be a very useful industrial 
policy instrument, which made it very attractive.5 
 
As a result of his visit and Porter’s recommendations the Basque Government de-
cided to move full speed with the strategy to develop manufacturing clusters. They de-
veloped a practical action plan, “Cluster Initiatives,” which was “an organized effort to 
increase the growth and competitiveness of clusters within a region, involving compa-
nies, Government and/or the research community.” This was a proactive attempt at in-
stitutional change. The policymakers understood that “mature cluster initiatives usually 
result in stable structures, called Institutions for Collaboration, or Cluster Associations 
in the Basque case.”6 Once they decided to proceed this way they determined the group 
of priority clusters and over the following years they developed the different Cluster As-
sociations.7 
 
The Basque Government also capitalized on existing opportunities (such as the 
restructuring of the steel sector, which led to a shift from basic steel production to the 
development of mini-mills; or the decision by McDonnell Douglas to establish a major 
new  supplier,  which  led  to  the  establishment  of  a  public-private  planning  group)  to 
learn about companies and the process of building clusters. The government developed 
a new program called the “Las Tres Rs: Rescate, Restructuración y Reorientación Laboral” 
(the Three Rs: Rescue, Restructuring, and Labor Reorientation) to help companies com-
pete internationally, and worked closely with local companies from the identified clus-
ters. The efforts to develop these clusters were overseen by the secretary of industry and 
the SEPRI. While many companies were skeptical (and many refused to join), the gov-
ernment was able to convince them of the benefits. The enticement of government sup-
port was a powerful incentive (Porter 2005: 10–11).  
                                                 
5Presentation by Juan Manuel Esteban, coordinator of Cluster Policy, Department of Industry, 
Trade and Tourism, Basque Government. Opatija, April 19–21, 2007. 
6Ibid. 
7Ibid. 6 
 
This strategy was underpinned by the Basque Government’s strategic decision to 
work with the principal economic and institutional stakeholders to sponsor initiatives to 
improve the competitive position of Basque firms. These included two industrial policy 
plans (1991–95 and 1996–99), an Industrial Technology Plan (1993–96), and a Science and 
Technology Plan (1997–2000). A key component of all of these initiatives was the objec-
tive of promoting cooperation among firms as a mean to compete in international mar-
kets;  as  well  as  the  attempt  to  increase  the  commitment  of  human  and  financial  re-
sources by Basque companies to R&D. As a result, starting at the beginning of the 1990s 
and as part of the implementation of the Basque Government’s Competitiveness Pro-
gram, the main Basque industrial sectors developed sectoral organizations to promote 
technical and commercial collaboration among companies from the sector and with third 
parties. The first cluster to emerge was the Machine Tools Cluster (1992), which was 
quickly followed by the Appliances Cluster (1992) and the Automotives Cluster (1993). 
They were followed by nine others (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: The Twelve Priority Sectoral Clusters in the Basque Country 
Aeronautics HEGAN: Aeronautics Cluster Association of the Basque Country 
(www.hegan.com) 
 
Automotive ACICAE: Cluster Association of Car Industries and Components of Euskadi 
(www.acicae.es) 
 
Audiovisual EIKEN: Audiovisual Cluster of Euskadi (www.eikencluster.com) 
 
Knowledge Cluster Association of Knowledge in Business Management 
(www.clusterconocimiento.com) (www.portaldelagestion.com) 
 
Electronic Household Appliances ACEDE: Cluster Association of Household Appliances 
of Euskadi (www.acede.es) 
 
Electronics, IT, and Telecommunications GAIA: Association of Electronics and 
Information Technologies of the Basque Country (www.gaia.es) 
 
Energy Energy Cluster Association (www.clusterenergia.com) 
 
Maritime Industry: Basque Maritime Forum. Association for the Promotion of the 
Basque Maritime Industry (www.foromaritimovasco.com) 
 
Machine Tools AFM: Spanish Association of Machine Tool Manufacturers (www.afm.es) 
 
Environment ACLIMA: Cluster Association of Environmental Industries 
(www.aclima.net) 
 
Paper CLUSP AP: Paper Cluster Association of Euskadi (www.clusterpapel.com) 
 
Port CPB: Port Cluster of Bilbao (www.uniportbilbao.es) 
 
Source: Euskadi.net (http://www.lehendakaritza.ejgv.euskadi.net/r48-
467/en/contenidos/informacion/cluster_sectoriales/en_cluster/clusters_s.html) 
 
From an organizational standpoint the main goal was to achieve general coordi-
nation and to break down the formal boundaries among members within sectors and 7 
 
boundaries among sectors. Hence each cluster association has a vertical head, reinforced 
with twelve SPRIT staffers, and also a horizontal head, one on each strategic area. The 
horizontal heads are at the same time heads for horizontal standard policies. Their role 
is to link cluster policy and horizontal standard policy. Moreover, the civil servants of 
the Department of Industry and SPRI staff (with extensive experience and knowledge of 
each area) attend all the Boards of Directors meetings, and other committee meetings, 
but they do not vote. Their main role is to provide support and advice, but not to inter-
fere or impose. 8 
 
In addition, the government developed a new Department of Industry and Clusters 
to work closely with the companies to identify goals and needs and to develop plans to 
achieve their goals. The process was very much instigated by the government (and in 
particular by this Department) but the government still avoided excessive intervention 
and adopted a flexible strategy to let groups form naturally.9 Yet, it still played a central 
role facilitating cluster meetings, providing funds for projects, and making cluster repre-
sentatives focus on long-term goals. 
 
The Basque Government and the companies were looking for increasing interna-
tionalization, technology development, quality and excellence in management, and im-
proved logistics, and they accepted that these goals (and the strategic competitive stra-
tegic challenges facing Basque companies) could not be simply addressed by individual 
actions from individual companies. Hence they agreed that improving the competitive-
ness of Basque companies would require cooperation and coordination. In this regard, 
they felt that the clusters could play a central role as “net servers” with a catalytic func-
tion, because they would intensify the interactions and speed of communication among 
members of the cluster. With the clusters they sought to “gather and spread strategic in-
formation; identify strategic challenges and potential synergies; evaluate the potential 
synergies, and finally identify and promote cooperation groups with common interests 
in order to generate cooperation projects.”10 Initially the program was funded with a 
modest amount: €2.3m per year for the whole program. 
 
In order to improve the operations of these clusters and to create uniform struc-
tures, the Basque Government named a Board of Directors for each cluster, which brings 
together the CEOs of local companies. This Board oversees a general manager who is in 
charge of managing the cluster committees. In addition the Basque Government asked 
each cluster in 2000 to develop a process to capture data and information; identify areas 
of cooperation within clusters, evaluate potential synergies, and form groups to realize 
them (Porter 2005: 16). 
 
This strategy was supplemented with a strong push toward the outside world 
with the Basque Government giving incentives and subsidies to companies to establish 
links abroad and develop international units; as well as also opening representative of-
fices and developing bilateral trade promotion agreements with other countries (Porter 
2005: 14).  
                                                 
8Presentation by Juan Manuel Esteban, April 19–21, 2007. 
9One  member  of  the  Automotive  Cluster  acknowledged  that  “without  the  government  we 
wouldn’t have existed. The government encouraged us to think about our long term vision when 
we may have been swept up in the daily business of running our companies” (Porter 2005, p. 12). 
10Presentation by Juan Manuel Esteban, April 19–21, 2007. 8 
 
In addition to the clusters, the Basque Government also developed technology 
parks. The first one was Bizkaia’s Zamudio Technology Park, which was inaugurated in 
1985, and was followed by the  Alava Technology  Park (1992) and the San Sebastian 
Technology Park (1993). The parks are owned by the regional government with the par-
ticipation of the local administration. These three parks were the first technology parks 
in Europe to be awarded ISO certification. They provide facilities for 230 companies with 
an annual turnover that exceeds €2 billion. Zamudio, for instance, hosts R&D operations 
of companies such as Rolls-Royce’s Spanish partner ITP, Alcatel or Air Liquide, and it 
has been chosen by the EU as the headquarters of the European Software Institute (ESI). 
They work on more than 1,500 research projects each year and spend on R&D more than 
200  million  Euros  a  year  (about  30  percent  of  total  R&D  expenditures  in  the  entire 
region).11 
 
The Basque Government has also worked actively to promote innovation, tech-
nology, and science. To this end it developed SARATEK, a private, not-for-profit associ-
ation involving eighty-nine Basque science and technology agents working in  R&D+I, 
with 10,000 research workers in all. The network includes eleven technological centers: 
TECNALIA, which is the largest private research corporation in Southern Europe, which 
brings together R&D businesses, IK4 (6 technological centers), as well as universities and 
private and public institutions working on  development, innovation, and technology 
transfer.12 It seeks to generate and develop scientific and technological knowledge, to 
improve business competitiveness. SARATEK works in many areas, including information 
and training, the promotion of cooperation and the creation of science- and technology-
based businesses.  
 
Other  government  initiatives  included  the  creation  of  Ikerbasque,  the  Basque 
Foundation for Science, which aims to help develop scientific research in the Basque 
Country by attracting researchers and helping them establish themselves; and the Insti-
tute for  Competitiveness and  Development, a  privately-managed,  public-service initiative 
linked to Deusto University, charged with the mission of providing support  to the public 
administrations, social and economic agents, and all the universities in the Basque Coun-
try in the field of competitiveness. 
 
A Regional Model of Coordination13 
 
As we have seen in the previous section, the Basque initiatives are a case of co-
ordination from the top, with the Basque Government playing a crucial role. But it did 
not happen by accident. One of the key elements that fostered these initiatives was the 
timing: it all started with the collapse of the authoritarian regime at a time when Basque 
companies wanted to expand but were facing one of the worst economic crises of the 
previous decades in sectors such as steel, shipbuilding and paper, in which the structure 
of costs was no longer competitive. This led to devastating job losses (around 250,000 
jobs were destroyed at the time in a region with a population of two million people). 
This crisis,  however, provided the impetus (and urgency) for change. The process of 
                                                 
11See “Economy in the Ascendancy,” in FDI:ForeignDirectInvestment, April 2004. 
12SPRI: http://www.usa.spri.net/aUS/web/en/spri/index.jsp 
13For this section of the paper I traveled to the Basque Country in 2003 and interviewed the lead-
ers of the main business associations, chambers of commerce, regional government, unions and 
business firms participating in the clusters. 9 
 
change was led by two main actors: on the one hand there were small- and medium 
enterprises, which needed to develop coordination mechanisms to address collective ac-
tion problems. They recognized that in an increasingly globalized world with intensify-
ing competition, their small size and lack of cooperation would hinder their efforts to 
compete effectively in international markets.14 On the other hand, the new democratic 
Basque Government was compelled to take immediate action to address the mounting 
crisis and intensifying social conflict. The priority was to develop a shock plan and to 
address the mounting industrial crisis with a plan for industrial restructuring. This plan 
planted the seeds of collaboration between the private and the public sector: the govern-
ment was willing to provide funds for the restructuring of these companies, but only in 
exchange for certain conditions, such as the development of technological innovations. 
 
Once the process of industrial reconversion was completed in the mid-1980s, the 
Basque Government shifted gears and started focusing on the promotion of products 
and new industries, at a time when unemployment, inflation, and interest rates were 
still quite high, and access to capital (and long term finance) was still significantly lim-
ited  because  of  the  existing  quasi-oligopoly  in  the  finance  sector.  The  government 
played a very active role developing an industrial policy and involving economic and 
social actors in the development and implementation of these policies, including busi-
ness associations, universities, training centers, trade unions, as well business schools. 
This helped set a tone of collaboration and a culture of consultation and participation.  
 
The regional government also helped define the key priorities: technological and 
knowledge development, innovation, and training. In this regard, one of the first steps, 
as we have seen, was the development of the knowledge cluster in 1996, which was in-
strumental in developing supply and demand for the creation of new projects, and also 
in convincing economic actors that, in a context of increasing competition and higher 
costs, a model based on low costs was no longer viable and had to be replaced by a 
model based on technology and strong management capabilities.15 To facilitate this tran-
sition the Basque Government focused on developing a new environment that would be 
very supportive of R&D efforts and new technologies. They drew inspiration from the 
Italian industrial districts (Sabel 1984), and the visit from Dr. Porter acted as a definite 
catalyst to implement the push for this shift.  
 
Furthermore, the Basque Government was also instrumental in convincing Bas-
que firms of the need to internationalize in order to force them to improve their competi-
tiveness, reduce their quasi-complete dependence on the Spanish market; and also di-
versify. This change, however, required a qualitative transformation not only in their 
production systems, but also in their management and organization. Yet, SMEs simply 
lacked the size to make this transition by themselves, and hence they had to find ways to 
develop mechanisms to coordinate with other firms and the Basque Government to re-
solve collective-action problems. 
 
The lack of access to capital was one of the main instigators that led companies to 
start developing networks to raise funds and to promote exports.16 At the same time, 
given the size and limited resources of the small- and medium enterprises, they were de-
                                                 
14This was stressed in my interviews with business leaders in May 2003. 
15Interview with Andrés Arizcorreta former president of the Knowledge Cluster, May 7, 2003. 
16Interview with Jesús Alberdi, leader of ELKAR, May 7, 2003. 10 
 
pendent on government intervention and support in multiple areas, such as capital and 
development  of  new  technologies.  The  Basque  Government  responded  to  these  de-
mands from the private sector and started implementing new action programs, and de-
veloping technological centers. The funding of these initiatives was often split between 
the government and the private sector, which benefited from the new technologies. It 
was in this context that SPRIT was created, with the initial focus on promoting the crea-
tion of new enterprises. One of the first instruments for achieving this goal was the plan 
to work on the rationalization of the industrial landscape (Industrialdea) and the develop-
ment of industrial centers (polígonos industriales). The government would lease land for 
eight to ten years to companies at the industrial center with a prearranged sale price, 
and the company would buy the property once it was already established and consoli-
dated.  
 
The government was also involved in funding initiatives. Companies faced two 
major barriers: lack of access to long-term capital and high financial costs (which were 
significantly higher than in the rest of Europe at that time). Originally, the reference was 
to the venture capital model of the Anglo-Saxon countries. However, the private sector 
faced significant hurdles in raising capital: first, venture capital firms barely existed. Fur-
thermore,  the  country  lacked  a  culture  of  savings  (and  most  of  the  savings  went  to 
Treasury  Bonds).  Finally,  the  secondary  market  was  virtually  inexistent,  and  public 
money was scarce because the central government still faced a significant public deficit. 
The central government passed a new law of Sociedades de Garantia Reciproca (Reciprocal 
Guarantee Societies) in 1978 and the Basque social actors took advantage of the new 
legislation creating a management fund in charge of managing capital risk funds. Yet, it 
was still difficult to find investors and they had to turn to private stockholders (mostly 
companies) that invested in the fund to facilitate the creation of new firms. In the end 
they developed capital risk societies with diverse purposes. For instance, the one focus-
ing on new (and risky) technologies was mostly funded with public funds, while others 
with more moderate risks were funded with private funds. These initiatives were sup-
ported by tax breaks, which promoted the development of private societies. The govern-
ment also played a role through the Basque savings and loans, which helped companies 
in crisis (during the crisis of the 1980s they bought participations in companies such as 
ACF). The savings and loans took in deposits and bought stocks in the companies, thus 
providing a stable stockholder nucleus to these companies. which in turn have allowed 
them to focus on the long-term and to make investment decisions. 
 
Once the seeds of cooperation were planted they started to flourish. For instance, 
in San Sebastian private firms joined in 1980 to develop ADEGI, the Gipuzkoa business 
association. This association emerged in response to the brutal crisis of the 1970s, which 
has led, as we have seen, to the dismantling of large companies, which in turn had dev-
astating  effects  on  the  region’s  SMEs.  They  had  two  kinds  of  members:  participating 
members (stockholders), and protective members (sponsors, commerce chambers, and 
the Basque Government). Private businesses have the majority of the capital.  
 
One of the main objectives of the new association was to facilitate access to capi-
tal to participating member firms. To better fulfill this role the Basque businesses created 
ELKARGI, a reciprocal guarantee company. One of their first actions was to sign an agree-
ment with the Basque Government to offer long-term funding to its members at sub-
sidized interest rates, with ELKARGI providing bank guarantees (to lower the risk pre-11 
 
mium, and thus allow member firms to receive lower interest rates). It also provided 
participatory loans, in which ELKARGI participates in the evolution of the business. The 
initiative was revolutionary in Spain: the criteria for giving loans were not only based on 
performance, but on the economic expectations of a future benefit (as venture capital 
does) (i.e., firms have to be able to generate resources to have enough funds to return the 
loan). ELKARGI has also promoted and funded innovation initiatives from participating 
member firms providing guarantees, and has facilitated the bureaucratic process.  
 
Another area in which the Basque Government has played a central role was in 
professional training. While large companies had their own internal training systems, 
SMEs lacked the resources and knowledge. This became a central priority in a context 
marked by constant and rapid technological changes that required urgent upgrading 
and updating of skills. Hence the focus from all parties turned to enhancing the educa-
tion system at all levels to improve human capital productivity.17   
 
As a result, professional training has also been an important area of cooperation. 
The professional training system in Spain has traditionally been quite discredited and 
separated from the real needs of companies. In the Basque Country the economic and 
social actors have tried to address this shortcoming and have worked together to devel-
op a well-functioning professional training system. Once again the Basque Government 
played a central role. The economic crisis between 1985 and 1993, which caused a sharp 
increase in unemployment, created the urgent need to “recycle” those people and pro-
vide them with new qualifications to be able to find new jobs. Seventy percent of the de-
mand at the time was for people with professional training skills.  
 
To respond to this demand the government approved in October 1997 the “Bas-
que Plan of Professional Training,” which included the development of an Integrated 
System of Qualifications and Professional Training. This plan involved three govern-
ment departments: labor, industry and education, as well as the social actors and the 
professional training centers, and it led to the establishment of the Basque Council of Pro-
fessional Training. The plan was articulated around three main institutions. First, the Bas-
que Observatory of Professional Training, which was put in charge of analyzing and re-
searching in detail developments in the Basque labor market, and to predict patterns for 
the future. It is closely connected with the firms and collects data from the national office 
of employment (INEM), as well as from the press and other observatories.  
 
The second institution was the  Basque Institute of Qualifications and  Professional 
Training. Based on the observatory’s findings this institute is in charge of determining 
the qualifications in individual productive sectors and to develop programs geared to 
providing the necessary training in a short period of time (usually no more than 3–6 
months in order to satisfy  urgent  demands from firms). They  have high competence 
standards that are determined with the participation of the representatives from nine 
key sectors for the  Basque economy. The results of their work are then  presented to 
trade union and business technicians who have to approve the technical specifications, 
which are then ratified by the Basque Council of Professional Training. 
 
The last institution is the Basque Agency for the Evaluation of Competences and Qual-
ity, which is charged with the evaluation of the whole system and implements a process 
                                                 
17Interview with Felix Iraola, leader of the Chamber of Commerce, San Sebastián, May 8, 2003. 12 
 
to recognize and make official the skills that have been learned by workers, which then 
become part of a registry of certifications of competences.  
 
The program is articulated through agreements between schools, companies and 
the Basque government, which provides funds and insurance, and the whole program is 
funded by companies and the Basque Government (partly with funds from the Euro-
pean  social funds). The system also  provides businesses  with funds for training and 
adaptation to new technologies. 
 
CONFEBASK, the Basque Business Confederation (established in 1983 by the three 
regional  business  associations:  ADEGI-Gipuzkoa,  CEBEK-Bizkaia,  and  SEA-Alava)  also 
played a central role in the initiative to improve the professional training system with 
two main objectives: to respond to the need for specialized skills of the Basque com-
panies, and also to improve the prestige of the professional training system and improve 
the employability of workers. To this end they worked with the Basque Government and 
took advantage of a legislative change in the national law regulating this field, which 
now allows students to do their internships in companies. In addition, business associa-
tions such as ADEGI have their own well-developed training programs. 
 
Since  the  Basque  Government  started  the  program  it  has  worked  with  over 
12,000 students, which has improved significantly their employability (reaching rates of 
almost  100  percent  in  certain  industrial  sectors).  The  success  of  the  program  is  also 
proved by the growth in registration rates of professional training programs (27,953 in 
the 2005–06 academic year) despite stagnant population rates. The Basque Government 
is now spending more in professional training (802.801 billion Euros in 2005 or 39.7 per-
cent of the total) than in higher education (252.237 billion Euros, or 12.5 percent), and 
more people complete professional training programs (30 percent in 2004–05) than uni-
versity programs (25.2 percent).18 
 
 The government has also established an assessment mechanism to poll the com-
panies that employ graduates from the program, in order to guarantee that students are 
learning what the companies need. Finally, while in the rest of Spain there is a problem 
with the high levels of temporary work (almost 31 percent in 2008), which results in high 
turnover rates, in the Basque country many firms have understood that if they have to 
invest in their workers it is in their best interest to keep them long term. Hence, firms 
such as ACF made strenuous efforts to keep the turnover to a minimum and the overall 
temporary rate is significantly lower (23.2 percent in 2005).19 
 
The professional training system has also played a significant role in technology 
transfers because many of the schools have better and more modern equipment than the 
companies, which can now hire employees who can work with the latest technologies. 
Driven  by the example of companies, the  schools themselves,  have made a push for 
quality,  and  many  have  achieved  ISO  quality  certification,  which  has  enhanced  their 
prestige, and hence their ability to recruit students. It is a holistic approach with a very 
                                                 
18Data  from  Memoria  Socioeconómica  Comunidad  Autónoma  del  País  Vasco  2005  (Bilbao:  Consejo 
Económico y Social, 2006), p. 260. 
19Interview with Andrés Arizcorreta manager of ACF, May 7, 2003. 13 
 
inclusive and responsive process that guarantees that the training programs respond to 
demands from the firms.20 
 
Cooperation has not only flourished among businesses or between business and 
the regional government, but also with unions. And this despite the fact that in addition 
to the main confederations (CCOO and UGT), the Basque Country has a third union, ELA-
STV, which has around 40 percent of representativeness, and almost 70 percent of the col-
lective agreements could be signed without UGT and CCOO. This has been facilitated by a 
strong cooperative culture (which has been an important factor, for instance, the Basque 
Country has some of the most successful and larges cooperatives in the world like Mon-
dragon) and the institutionalization of cooperation mechanisms such as the creation of 
the tripartite Basque Economic and Social Council, which has played a central role at the re-
gional macro level building bridges among the social actors and fostering a culture of 
consultation and consensus. But cooperation has extended to the micro level. Some com-
panies (such as ACF) have gone as far as to selling stock to the unions at a subsidized 
price (they control 18 percent of the stock), and offering unions the possibility of parti-
cipating  in  managerial  decisions  (something  similar  to  the  German  codetermination 
model).  
 
In  the  area  of  industrial  relations  there  has  also  been  significant  cooperation 
between unions, employers and the Basque Government, and this despite the relevance 
of national-level bargaining and the interference of political factors linked with the sov-
ereignty dispute.21 The social actors have been able to overcome historical conflicts and 
antagonisms, aggravated during the dictatorship when employers were largely associ-
ated with the regime. Unions now accept and do not question the role of the private sec-
tor and recognize that companies have to fulfill certain requirements in order to survive 
and compete.22 The Basque Government has been very active in this field as well. The 
Council of Labor Relations of the Basque government, a bipartite institution (with seven 
representatives from CONFESBAK and seven from the unions–three ELA, two CCOO, and 
one LAB/UGT), has played a critical role in areas such labor mediation and in refereeing 
industrial collective conflicts, in which it pioneered an agreement in 1984.  
 
The  wage  bargaining  structure  is  regulated  by  national  regulations.  For  most 
companies minimum salaries are negotiated at the sectoral level and they do not have 
the flexibility of lowering them or making substantive changes. Yet, CONFESBAK plays a 
central role in collective bargaining, although there are differences based on regions. ELA 
supports a model based on provincial collective agreements that set minimum standards 
(including  for  salaries)  and  are  then  complemented  by  agreements  at  the  firm  level 
(which is the prevalent model in Guipuzkoa).23 Basque employers, for their part, are try-
ing (as in other parts of Spain) to extend the scope of collective bargaining to make it 
more comprehensive and include issues such as the management of human resources, or 
the organization of the firm and the deployment of human capital. They are also push-
ing for the decentralization of collective bargaining and to establish the firm as the bar-
                                                 
20Interview with Jorge Arevalo, vice counselor for Professional Training of the Basque Govern-
ment, May 9, 2003. 
21Interview with José Miguel Unamue, from ELA, May 9, 2003. 
22Interview with Martin Auzutendi, counselor of labor relations of the Basque government, May 
9, 2003. 
23Interview with José Miguel Unamue, from ELA, May 9, 2003. 14 
 
gaining unit, in order to better take into account the reality of specific firms and the in-
creasing individualization of industrial relations. Unions, however, resist this push for 
decentralization because they are afraid it will hurt the principle of solidarity.24 The so-
cial actors have been reasonably flexible to accommodate each other’s demands and the 
institutional  structure  has  facilitated  agreements.  Overall,  there  is  consensus  that  the 
system works relatively well: labor conflict is limited and the number of strikes has de-
clined (i.e., the number of working days lost has decreased from 1,100 in 2000 to 603 in 
2005), and there has been wage moderation.25  
 
Finally, the clusters and technology parks have also played a very constructive 
role in corporate governance and the rules governing intercompany relationships: that 
is, technology transfer, standard setting and competitive policy. For instance, the process 
of  registering  patents,  which  is  considered  quite  bureaucratic  (and  individualistic) 
throughout  Spain,  has  been  facilitated  by  business  associations  such  as  ADEGI  (the 
Gipuzkoa Business Association), and the technology centers are playing a central role in 
the transference of technology to firms throughout the region. 
 
Outcomes and Performance 
 
The institutional outcome of these initiatives has been notable. There are ten ap-
plied technology centers, thirteen R&D centers, four research laboratories, two public re-
search organizations, and three technology parks (Porter 2005: 15). Other tangible results 
include the creation of several Export Consortiums; the development of technological 
projects “interclusters” (such as Electronics for Automotion, Automotion-Machine-Tool, 
or Energy-Environment), and finally there have been impressive results in Excellence in 
Management evaluated according to the European Foundation for Quality Management, 
(EFQM) model.  
 
Other results are less tangible and difficult to measure, but they are still very im-
portant. For instance, the clusters have contributed to foster trust among members, and 
cooperation among competitors. Furthermore, they have helped to break down the tra-
ditional barriers between the public and the private sectors and helped reaffirm the prin-
ciple that progress was contingent on public-private collaborations. Finally, they have 
promoted a common strategic orientation and shared long-term objectives.26 
 
The economic results have also been remarkable. The Basque Country has the 
highest disposable per capita income in Spain (it grew from 74.37 percent of the EU av-
erage in 1980 to 100.2 by 2000, and 128.2 in 2006), and only five EU countries (Austria, 
Denmark, Holland, Ireland, and Luxembourg) have higher per capita GDP than the Bas-
que Country. Unemployment fell to 3.4 percent in 2007, which has been supported by 
wage  moderation.  Moreover,  the  Basque  GDP  has  been  growing  since  the  1980s  at  a 
faster rate than that of Spain and the EU. 
 
 The effort in  R&D has also been very important. According to EUSTAT data in 
2004, 769 million euros were spent in activities related to scientific research and techno-
                                                 
24Interview with Eduardo García Elosua, leader of CCOO in the Basque Country (May 8, 2003). 
25Interview with Martin Auzutendi, counselor of Labor Relations of the Basque government, May 
9, 2003. 
26Presentation by Juan Manuel Esteban, April 19–21, 2007. 15 
 
logical development (1.44 percent of GDP, compared with 1.07 percent in Spain).27 This 
investment has translated into innovation. According to EUSTAT data, during the 2001–03 
period 16.3 percent of the establishments were innovators, and this percentage reaches 
31.9 percent if we only take into account establishments with more than nine employees. 
This is 2.2 percentage points higher than the average in Spain. The total expenditures in 
technological innovations reached 2,010 million euros in 2004 (1,029 from the industry 
and 964 million for the service sector), which represents 3.8 percent of the GDP (1,836 
million in 2003 or 3.9 percent). Most of these expenses have been in internal R&D (38.3 
percent) and in the purchasing of machinery (39.6 percent).28 
 
Furthermore, industrial production has also experienced extraordinary growth 
as a result of the diversification of industrial production in the region, which has ex-
panded from the traditional activities derived from metal to now include sectors such as 
chemicals, petrochemical and refinery, industrial electronics, nanotechnology, robotics 
and biotechnologies.29 
 
Finally, Basque companies have been responding successfully to the competitive 
challenge of globalization and they have been increasing their presence in other coun-
tries. The degree of economic opening of the Basque economy has increased (i.e., it was 
123.25 percent of  GDP in 2004 compared with 53.10 percent in Spain, 71.14 percent in 
Germany, or 55.2 percent in the United Kingdom), and the exporting tendency of the 
Basque economy (exports of goods and services over GDP) has grown to 30.65 percent, a 
figure well above other countries (exports of goods and services over GDP represented 
26.64 percent in Italy, 25.97 percent in France, and 24.90 percent in Spain).30 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper has sought to analyze the impact that different institutional settings 
have on business activities and also the possibility of building coordination capacity in 
countries that lack a propitious institutional framework. I have shown that institutional 
change  is  dependent  on  different  political  approaches  to  competitive  pressures.  Eco-
nomic actors develop the institutions that they need, but it is necessary to explain how, 
why and when. 
 
While the VoC approach theorizes the complementarities among forms of insti-
tutions that tend to make them persist, it does not say much about how those comple-
mentary institutions come about and how they change while preserving complementari-
ties.  In  other  words,  it  does  not  explain  sufficiently  how  institutions  with  important 
complementaries come into being where they didn’t exist. This paper seeks to address 
this shortcoming by exploring why (and how) change happened in a Spanish autono-
mous region: the Basque Country. It looks at the different varieties of coordination as 
changing systems, not as equilibrium systems. 
 
                                                 
27Data  from  Memoria  Socioeconómica  Comunidad  Autónoma  del  País  Vasco  2005  (Bilbao:  Consejo 
Económico y Social, 2006), p. 120. 
28Ibid., pp. 120–126. 
29SPRI: http://www.usa.spri.net/aUS/web/en/spri/index.jsp. 
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The article makes three important contributions to the Varieties of Capitalism 
literature (VoC). First, by examining the political processes that brought the institutions 
into  being,  and  showing  the  decisive  role  that  subnational  governments  can  play  in 
creating institutions and making them work, it brings the political back onto center stage 
(Thelen 2004). The paper looks at coordination as a political problem in which actors are 
constantly assessing and evaluating institutions, and views stability as a political out-
come. It focuses not merely on the individual action of actors, but also on their collective 
actions as well (see Hancké, Rhodes, and Thatcher 2007: 4).  
 
Second,  by “bringing the state back in,” it addresses the  VoC literature’s ten-
dency to downplay state action and largely ignore its distinctive role in CMEs and LMEs 
(Schmidt 2006: 9–11). This is a particular shortcoming given that the role of the state 
remains higher in Spain than in CMEs and LMEs. Indeed, as we have seen coordination in 
the Basque Country not only depended on the organizational capacities of actors, but al-
so on state intervention, which also influences the shape and character of coalitions (Mo-
lina and Rhodes 2007). By deconstructing state action and examining the degree and 
form of government actions and practices, the paper considers state action in all its com-
plexity (both at the national and regional levels).  
 
Finally, the focus of the VoC literature has been largely on national models of co-
ordination. This approach, however, underplays the role of institutional arrangements at 
the regional level in determining national adjustment paths. By focusing on a particular 
region, the Basque Country, this paper looks at the dynamics of coordination and adjust-
ment at the regional level.  
 
Indeed, the analysis of the Basque case shows that it is possible to create institu-
tions to foster coordination at the regional level, and this even in a region that has been 
ravaged by conflict and terrorism. It illustrates the conditions under which it is feasible 
for countries to develop a sustainable path toward coordination (McDermott 2005: 8). 
First, crises and economic shocks  provide moments of opportunity that open  up the 
space for change and for new coalitions to emerge. Second, as we have seen in the case 
of the Basque Country, institutional change is more likely to succeed when state policies 
and actions try to redress resource asymmetries and resolve existing problems in the 
provision of collective goods. Coordination is also more likely when associations are en-
compassing in membership, inclusive and established to address specific problems or 
challenges. Finally, government actions should be aimed at improving and facilitating 
collaboration  among  groups,  sharing  of  resources  and  the  achievement  of  common 
goals. 
 
These  initiatives  have  been  characterized  by  the  following  common  threads: 
First, public-private network of organizations; second, public and private funding; third, 
pooling of resources to develop services to address common collective action problems; 
and finally, the use of these institutions as deliberative bodies to identify new challenges 
and develop further areas of cooperation (see McDermott 2005).  
 
The Basque model of coordination is a model of state-influenced “coordination 
from the top,” which has been highly dependent on state intervention. However, while 
the Basque Government has played a central leadership role in the coordination efforts, 
it is important to stress that its main function has been to support and complement the 17 
 
actions of the private sector. The clusters were based on a real private-public partner-
ship. It was clear that the role of the government was not to choke the efforts of the 
private sector, but mostly to define the mission and the objectives of the cluster. Indeed 
it leads but it does not impose. Cluster membership was open to all the organizations 
that were part of the “natural” clusters, and the success of these initiatives has been 
based  on  factors  such  as  shared  values  and  goals;  the  presence  of  a  good  facilitator 
(usually from SPRIT or the Department of Industry, Trade and Tourism); regular meet-
ings (almost daily) and interactions between civil servants and the heads of the Cluster 
Associations; and finally a high level of consensus on the decisions and actions.31 In sum, 
the public sector has given independence to the private one, and has not become in-
volved in the management of private firms.32  
 
One of the key for the success of this model has been the independence from po-
litical interference. Civil society is strong, articulated and well organized in the Basque 
Country, and, therefore, it is not easy for the public sector to influence or interfere. Firms 
and business leaders have bought into the model because they have valued the role that 
public institutions have played in fostering coordination among economic actors.33 The 
strategic choices of the economic actors have been shaped by the local economic orders 
in which they were situated. Much like in Italy, in the Basque Country “economic actors 
embedded in local economic orders possessing  dense but relatively egalitarian socio-
political networks were able to share information, form alliances, build trust, and hence 
negotiate the process of industrial adjustment” (Locke 1995: 175).  
 
And this happened at the time when private firms needed support from the Bas-
que government to deal with the devastating consequences of the economic crisis of the 
1970s-1980s, as well as the new competitive challenges emanating from European inte-
gration and the emergence of new competitors from developing countries. Companies 
realized that they had to focus on exports and they needed a new regulatory and institu-
tional framework that facilitated this transition.34 Hence companies demanded a norma-
tive framework and the financial support, which made the development of these coor-
dination institutions possible.  
 
Another relevant factor to account for the success of this model has been the im-
portance of moving from the bottom up, and responding to demands from the firms (as 
opposed to trying to impose decisions on the firms), and to grow little by little. An addi-
tional contributing factor has been the fact that key players were not only intimately 
connected, but also that there was a fluid transition between the public and the private 
sectors. Many of the leaders of many of the business association and commerce cham-
bers had served in the public sector as well and vice versa; many companies’ leaders had 
also served in the public sector and public servants had also made the transition to the 
private sector. This fluid movement from the private to the public sector (and vice versa) 
facilitated  communication,  cross-fertilization,  and  fostered  a  culture  of  dialogue  in 
which the players were looking at the overall and long-term interests of the region, not 
                                                 
31Presentation by Juan Manuel Esteban, April 19–21, 2007. 
32Interview with Joss Rubia from COFESBANK, May 8, 2003. 
33Interview with Andrés Arizcorreta, director of the rolling stock producing company ACF, which 
employs over 20,000 people and has operations all over the world on May 7, 2003. He had been 
president of the knowledge cluster. 
34Interview with Felix Iraola, leader of the Chamber of Commerce, San Sebastián, May 8, 2003. 18 
 
just merely at their parochial ones.35 This fostered a culture in which regardless of where 
the initiative originated (whether it was in the private or public sector), there was a con-
vergence of efforts. The small size of the Basque Country has facilitated all this. Finally, 
cooperative relations in the Basque Country have been fostered by the long Foral tradi-
tion  of  good  administration,  as  well  as  a  strong  and  entrenched  cooperative  culture 
(marked, as noted earlier, by the success of some of the largest cooperatives in the world 
such as Mondragon). This culture is quite unique to the Basque Country. Finally, it is 
important  to  note  that  there  is  not  a  homogenous  and  single  model  of  cooperation 
throughout  the  Basque  Country.36  Indeed,  coordination  is  more  developed  and  has 
worked better in some regions than others. 
 
The Basque Country shows the critical importance of geographical location and 
physical  proximity,  which  generates  important  benefits  and  allows  for  effective  re-
sponses to the challenges of globalization. The new ultra-competitive environment re-
quires companies that are flexible to adapt to shifting circumstances and changes in de-
mand. This environment will demand flexibility from companies and workers and also 
human capital with adequate skills. Yet, only cooperation mechanisms, along the lines of 
the ones that we have examined in this paper, will allow the private and public sectors 
to educate people to succeed in this  new  system and optimize the use of  new tech-
nologies. Therefore, places such as the Basque Country, with an industrial base of SMEs 
that uses medium-high technologies and has a high innovation capacity and an edu-
cated labor force are well-positioned to compete, provided they constantly enhance their 
capacity to educate and train people, as well as their ability to innovate to develop pro-
cesses and products with high value-added and high-technology capacity. They will also 
have to identify and focus on sectors of high demand. In the end, the key will be the 
management of knowledge in order to continue generating qualified human capital to 
attract investment and innovate. 
                                                 
35This model has has gravely deleterous effects in countries like the the U.S. or France, where the 
so-called “revolving door” or pantouflage has often led to cronyism, corruption and the diversion 
of state functions from their public purposes. It is too early to predict whether the same outcomes 
will take place in the Basque Country. 
36Interview with Felix Iraola, leader of the Chamber of Commerce, San Sebastián, May 8, 2003.  19 
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